Ideas from 'Epistemic Norms' by John L. Pollock [1986], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Epistemology - An Anthology' (ed/tr Sosa,E. /Kim,J.) [Blackwell 2000,0-631-19724-9]].

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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth

8820	Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth

8819	We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity

8822	Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs

8818	Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification

8811	What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something?

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure

8817	Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism

8814	Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations

8823	Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

8813	If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

8812	Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external

8816	Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification

8815	Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use